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Ruth Macklin
On January 8, 2014, a front-page story in the New York Times reported the
case of Marlise Muñoz, a pregnant, brain-dead woman in Texas who was being
kept on life supports (Fernandez and Eckholm 2014). Despite the patient’s stated
wish not to be left on life supports, the hospital invoked a Texas law that prohibits
doctors from removing them from pregnant patients. In contrast to other cases in
which family members of patients on life supports have insisted on continuation
of medical treatment despite the futility of such treatment, in this case the parents
and husband of the brain-dead patient sought the removal of life supports.
As does every state in the United States, Texas has a law on advance direc-
tives: wishes expressed by persons with decisional capacity regarding what they
want by way of medical treatment if they lost capacity and became incompe-
tent. That law defines “life-sustaining treatment” as “treatment that, based on
reasonable medical judgment, sustains the life of a patient and without which
the patient will die” (Health and Safety Code, Sec. 166.002, Definitions). But
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Ms. Muñoz was already dead, so it is reasonable to question whether the statute
even applied to this case. The Texas law also contains the provision that prohi-
bits removing life supports from a pregnant patient: “A person may not with-
draw or withhold life-sustaining treatment under this subchapter from a
pregnant patient” (Health and Safety Code, Sec.166.049, Pregnant Patients). In
addition, in the absence of a written advance directive, the law provides for the
spouse, along with the attending physician, to make the decision to withdraw
treatment of an incompetent patient. However, if the attending physician “re-
fuses to honor a patient’s advance directive or a health care or treatment deci-
sion made by or on behalf of a patient,” the case must then be reviewed by an
ethics committee, followed by a series of procedural steps (Sec. 166.046). In the
case of Ms. Muñoz, the physician told the family that the hospital would not
comply with the request to remove life supports based on the Texas law that
prohibits removal of life supports from pregnant patients.
In a judicial determination, district court judge R. H. Wallace Jr. ordered the
hospital to remove the patient’s life supports, contending that the law did not
apply to her because she was dead. The hospital’s lawyer argued that although
Ms. Muñoz met the clinical criteria for brain death, the law still did apply to her.
Meanwhile, the hospital admitted that the fetus was not viable, and medical re-
cords obtained by the family’s lawyer showed that the fetus was abnormal. The
hospital complied with the court order and removed the life supports from
Ms. Muñoz.
According to the accepted scientific definition of brain death, Marlise
Muñoz was dead. One viewpoint holds that dead persons no longer have any
interests. Indeed, it is questionable even to use the word person in discussing
dead bodies. If one accepts that viewpoint, Marlise Muñoz had no interests in
whether her body was used as a “human incubator” that would carry her fetus
to term. On the other hand, the legal concept that the state has an “interest” in
life might be used to defend the Texas statute. So if the state does have such in-
terests but the dead Marlise Muñoz had no interests, why should the attempt of
Texas to uphold its statute not prevail?
Alison Reiheld
There are at least two considerations here. One relates to the application
of the statute to living patients, and the other relates to what the statute ex-
presses.
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One reason it should not prevail is that the statute itself arguably—and in
the finding of the court that led to life support finally being withdrawn—did
not apply to Ms. Muñoz. It would, however, apply to living patients. Suppose
Ms. Muñoz were not brain dead but rather in a vegetative state or judged to be
minimally conscious. These are precisely the sorts of occasions in which pa-
tients wish to exert their prospective autonomy through advance directives and
conversations with surrogate decision makers. The prospective autonomy of
any woman of child-bearing age is thus constrained by the law.
Now, one could indeed argue that the state has obligations to fetuses—
has an interest in preserving the lives of these potential citizens. That is pre-
cisely what Roe v. Wade (1973) both asserted and limited: that the state’s inter-
est in the well-being of the fetus exists but does not become compelling until
the point of viability, which is to say the point at which the fetus has a reason-
able chance of survival outside of the pregnant woman’s body. Until that point,
a pregnant female citizen’s rights over her own body and reproduction allow
her to choose an abortion. Of course, as technology improves, the point of via-
bility is pushed ever earlier during pregnancy. Legally, a pregnant woman’s
right to an abortion is thus already contingent on medical technology. But
abortion represents an instance when, as framed by the courts, the state’s inter-
est in preserving the fetus is in tension with a pregnant woman’s autonomy; it
is simply that the balance between them shifts at the point of viability and per-
haps especially once the pregnant woman has voluntarily chosen to continue
to term.
The application of the Texas statute to living patients, even if we grant
that it did not apply properly to the deceased Ms. Muñoz, is part of a larger
trend that is exceedingly damaging to the autonomy rights of pregnant women,
and to the possibility that they have value above and beyond that of “fetal con-
tainer.” As a legal doctrine, the Texas statute is legally and morally problematic.
The fact that, instance by instance, such laws are overturned on appeal is of
limited consolation.
This ties into the second reason that the state of Texas’s attempt should
not prevail: whether or not the statute is upheld, it expresses a devaluation of
pregnant women, and of the autonomy of women who might become pregnant,
by presenting exceptions to their advance directives that simply do not apply to
men and will never apply to women who cannot become pregnant. That preg-
nant women will be treated to any degree as “fetal containers” is morally
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troubling on any number of standards of morality. Kantian ethics, for instance,
prohibits the reduction of persons to “merely a means to an end.”
Ruth Macklin
But obstetricians typically consider the fetus a “second patient.” How
does that fit into this picture?
Alison Reiheld
Of course, in a wanted pregnancy, the fetus is a second patient. Its welfare
should matter to obstetricians. But the autonomy and well-being of the preg-
nant woman who carries it should not cease to matter. In Judith Jarvis Thom-
son’s words, the pregnant woman may house the fetus, but we must not forget
that she is a person who houses it (Thomson 1971).
Sidney Callahan
I think dead human beings retain certain relevant interests after death.
Thus, Marlise Muñoz has interests. Like other dead humans, she has interests
in not having her body abused or mutilated, her legal will annulled, her reputa-
tion defamed, or her family members persecuted. I would argue that individual
living human beings in every stage of development and health have interests, as
do group entities, communities, collectives, families, and the state. Interest is an
ambiguously defined word, but minimally it can refer to a stake in preserving
and pursuing valuable and advantageous outcomes in time.
Women who can become pregnant and are deciding on their treatment
directives should consider whether they should be changed if they are pregnant.
Women are known to go to great lengths in using technology to enable their
fetus to be born. Even a dying woman could view sustaining her child’s life as a
final altruistic and loving act. The value of kinship ties is important to surviving
families. Maternal altruism is now recognized as an evolutionary constant in
primates, much less in our altruistic, future-conscious, kinship-valuing cul-
tures. One of the problematic aspects in the Muñoz case is whether Marlise




I also agree with Alison’s comments, but I want to approach the question
from a different angle. Let’s grant, for the sake of the argument, both that the
dead have no interests and that the state has an interest in life. If we take these
ideas both seriously and consistently, then there is no reason to restrict the use
of a brain-dead body to that of gestating a fetus. Organ donation would be
compulsory, for one thing. And we could take things even further, in the inter-
est of preserving life. I wrote in my blog post (Bluhm 2014) about Willard Gay-
lin’s idea of “neomorts,” brain-dead individuals kept in hospital-like
“bioemporia” and used, among other things, as a source of donor organs and
tissues and a manufacturing system for hormones and antitoxins. The use of
such neomorts would also clearly promote the state’s interest in life.
But we don’t do this. Even jurisdictions that have presumed consent for
organ donation allow people to opt out. Moreover, in a nonmedical context, we
have laws that limit what can be done with human remains, and some jurisdictions
have separate charges for murderers who also desecrate the body of their victim.
Ruth Macklin
Is this an isolated case of putting the interests of the fetus above the interests
of the pregnant woman (even though the woman in this case was already dead)?
Alison Reiheld
I’d like to say that people who argue that the Texas statute is part of a slip-
pery slope to treating women as merely fetal containers are committing a fal-
lacy. Alas, this is not a lone case but part of a pattern that takes women’s own
preferences less and less into account. As I argued in my IJFAB Blog entry “Not
All Objectification Is Sexual: The Return of the Fetal Container” (Reiheld
2013), these constraints on pregnant women’s autonomy have been building
for decades. Howard Minkoff and Anne Drapkin Lyerly (2010) make just such
a point in their Hastings Center Report essay “Samantha Burton and the Rights
of Pregnant Women Twenty Years after In re. A.C.” Examples found through-
out their essay and in my blog entry include forcing pregnant women to attend
inpatient drug rehab even in the absence of current drug use in order to protect
the fetus from possible relapse, using police power to compel pregnant women
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to undertake bed rest even after they have attempted to refuse it against medical
advice (the case of Samantha Burton), compelling pregnant women to undergo
preterm C-sections even after they have refused them (the case of Angela Car-
der and many others), refusing to permit a trial of labor after C-sections and
thus requiring delivery by repeat C-section, and prosecuting for murder preg-
nant women who attempted suicide while pregnant.
Pregnant women’s own preferences are indeed being overridden, and it’s
not even as nice as the classic grounds for overriding patient autonomy: the pa-
tient’s own benefit. When overriding the pregnant woman’s autonomy rights
in favor of the best interests of the fetus, her benefit is simply out of the picture.
We see this clearly in cases in which invasive surgical procedures that might
hasten death (Angela Carder) or present higher risks of complications are im-
posed against the pregnant woman’s will and for the alleged benefit of the fetus.
Sidney Callahan
Preserving the fetus’s interests in the Muñoz case may also not be possible
in the present state of technology. Moreover, the fact that an unviable fetus
would not be protected from abortion by Roe v. Wade supports the decision to
withdraw life support. One can disagree with the morality of Roe but see a
value in obeying the law as the present law. Yet laws change as science and
moral insight progress as in granting women equality.
Ruth Macklin
Alison and Sidney referred earlier to advance directives. Can someone
please elaborate on that issue and how it might apply to this case?
Alison Reiheld
To get a little more fine-grained with respect to advance care planning, it
is worth noting that Linda Emanuel et al. (1995), in their well-known piece
“Advance Care Planning as a Process,” argue that patients should run through
scenarios with their physicians. It may be that, for some pregnant women, this
conflict between their prospective autonomy and the Texas statute would be
avoided if one of the scenarios discussed is whether their treatment wishes
would change if they were pregnant at the time they became nondecisional. (I
wish to thank several of my undergraduate medical ethics students for making
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this nuanced point during fall 2013 and spring 2014 discussions of this case.) If
women say they would not want life support withdrawn while pregnant, then
there will be no conflict with the statute. However, the conflict will remain if
they wish to have life support withdrawn even while pregnant.
Whether or not the law will override a pregnant woman’s medical auton-
omy merely because she is a pregnant woman is clearly contingent on her hap-
pening to agree with it. That sort of justification isn’t good enough with
paternalism—respect the patient’s autonomous preferences if and only if they
agree with the provider’s—and it is not good enough here.
Ruth Macklin
As Alison pointed out earlier, there are two issues regarding the Texas
statute: “One relates to the application of the statute to living patients, and the
other relates to what the statute expresses.” Can someone elaborate a bit more
on the state’s interest in life?
Frances Kissling
It’s worth noting that state interest can be expressed throughout preg-
nancy, through things like not paying for abortions, counseling designed to dis-
courage abortion, and various pronatal policies.
Sidney Callahan
The state of Texas has an interest in protecting all of its population, born
and unborn, from harm. Laws are one means the state uses to preserve the in-
terests of all parties. Texas laws protect the interests of the dying, like Marlise
Muñoz, by giving power to their advance directives about life support, and to
their families in making these decisions. The state also, in my opinion, validly
protects the interests of the unborn fetus who will certainly die when life sup-
port and the life-giving power of its mother are withdrawn. Thus, the challenge
is to resolve and reconcile the interests of all the parties in a complex case.
Robyn Bluhm
The state’s interest in life really seems to be an issue only when the life in
question is that of a fetus. We don’t compel parents to give up a kidney, or even
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blood, to save their child’s life. And in the United States, at least, the state’s
interest in life doesn’t extend to ensuring that children receive life-saving medi-
cal treatment, and certainly not to ensuring that adults do. It seems that, as Sue
Sherwin (2001) has put it, our society is pronatalist but doesn’t seem to care as
much about children once they’ve been born.
So there is something about the case of pregnant women, in particular,
that makes it seem reasonable to some to use their bodies as incubators if they
are declared brain-dead during pregnancy. As I said above, I agree with Alison
that we already tend to objectify pregnant women. We also tend to romanticize
motherhood, thinking that women will (or should) do anything for their child:
being left on life support until the child can be born is just something that a
good mother would want to do (if, of course, she were able to say so). As Alison
and Sidney have pointed out, some women might indeed want to do this—and
it would be a good idea to address the possibility in advance care planning. But
note that even doing this much is granting that women’s wishes, even when
they’re pregnant, carry moral weight.
Alison Reiheld
The seeming alignment of a woman’s choice to continue the pregnancy to
term with the state’s interest in the well-being of the fetus has been used in legal
justifications to limit the autonomy of pregnant women with respect to their
conduct during pregnancy and childbirth. Minkoff and Lyerly (2010) note that
a common argument against the rights of pregnant women to medical auton-
omy is that “the value and ‘humanity’ of a fetus must be championed regardless
of costs to pregnant women, even in the context of a desired pregnancy . . . .
[E]ven with legal precedent consistently on their side, pregnant women have
nevertheless had their right to refuse surgery, their right to be treated like other
citizens when prosecuted for drug possession, their right to information and
voluntariness needed for informed consent, and even their right to die chal-
lenged” (14). That does not, as Robyn so nicely put it, “grant that women’s
wishes carry weight.”
Sidney Callahan
The use of language in these difficult ethical dilemmas is significant.
Oddly enough, the only place I encounter degrading descriptions of pregnant
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women such as “human incubator,” “fetal container,” “house,” et cetera is in
feminist discourse describing what their opponents are thinking. But in pro-life
literature, I see talk of mothers and babies, families, and maternal nurturing of
new life. Yet this language also gets derided as romanticizing motherhood.
Many feminists, like myself as a member of Feminists for Life, see pregnancy as
an exercise of life-giving creative power and rescue that only the woman can
fulfill. The value of medical autonomy is important but should not override the
equal human value and interests of a new human life.
Frances Kissling
Is it the descriptions that are degrading, or is it the treatment described
that is degrading of women? I don’t doubt that the intent of those who support
the pregnancy exclusion provisions in advance directive laws, from the Catholic
bishops to various state right-to-life groups, is to save fetal life, but there does
seem to be an assumption that women, left to their own devices—or their fa-
milies who would act in their interests when they cannot decide—would not
care about the loss of the pregnancy.
Also, there seems to me a lacuna in the language of mothers, babies, fa-
milies, and maternal nurturing related to the Muñoz situation. I was deeply
moved by the family’s experience of their daughter and wife, dead but on life
support for two months. This is how her husband, Erick Muñoz, described
their pain in an affidavit: “When I bend down to kiss her forehead, her usual
scent is gone, replaced instead with what I can only describe as the smell of
death. As a paramedic, I am very familiar with this smell, and I now recognize
it when I kiss my wife. In addition, Marlise’s hands no longer naturally grip
mine for an embrace. Her limbs have become so stiff and rigid due to her dete-
riorating condition that now, when I move her hands, her bones crack, and her
legs are nothing more than dead weight” (Muñoz 2014).
Robyn Bluhm
Sidney, I think your point about the use of language is striking. I think
that Frances is right, though, that the treatment these terms describe is degrad-
ing to women. Talking about mothers and babies seems to ignore the point
that, in this case, Marlise Muñoz would never get to be a mother to her baby or,
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more broadly, that not all women who are pregnant want to be mothers to the
children they carry.
Frances Kissling
Marlise Muñoz’s case was exceptional in that she was dead when the
Texas statute was applied to her, and we also had no way of knowing, as Sidney
points out, what her wishes would have been had she known she was pregnant.
Unfortunately, even when we do know what pregnant women would want if
they faced a situation similar to Muñoz’s, in thirty states, they don’t get to
decide that they would not want to be kept alive. According to Katherine Taylor
and Lynn Paltrow (2014), “A majority of these laws prohibit life support from
being withdrawn from a woman even if she retains some consciousness and is
suffering extreme pain.” Taylor and Paltrow further note that most of these
states do not include information regarding the pregnancy exclusions in gov-
ernment materials on living wills and advance directives. Even the most rudi-
mentary right to information and thus informed consent is denied to women.
Legally, it does not matter what a pregnant woman wants. Even if she
wishes to stay on life support and give her fetus the best chance for a healthy
life, the state, not she, decides whether that will happen; the state, not she,
could decide to save money and deliver the fetus at twenty-eight weeks and
withdraw life support.
The assumption that a state interest in fetal life would result in what is
best for unborn children is flawed. As others here have said, the state—and
notably states such as Texas—has shown little interest in what is best for born
children. These laws are not in anyone’s interest. They serve a political purpose
and do harm to women’s health, security, and rights.
Ruth Macklin
Frances makes a good point in saying that such laws serve a political pur-
pose. One would not say that about child protection laws, since there is wide
societal consensus that children require protection from abusive or neglectful
parents and other caregivers. Such societal consensus does not exist with regard
to fetal protection laws.
As we draw our conversation to a close, it is evident that we are all in
agreement that this case, because of its context in wider debates of fetal welfare
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and pregnant women’s autonomy, raises serious issues about advance care
planning, informed consent, and refusal for pregnant women.
Robyn Bluhm and Alison Reiheld
We, in particular, agree that it is counterproductive to focus solely on
questions about fetal welfare and fetal rights, as has too often been the way that
discussions of abortion have been framed in bioethics. The issues raised are far
too nuanced, and the values far too pluralistic, for such simplicity. At the same
time, the autonomy of pregnant women must be respected and valued; laws
and policies should encourage women to make difficult decisions about the cir-
cumstances under which a pregnancy should be maintained (should they later
become unable to express their wishes) and should also respect those choices
when they are known.
Ruth Macklin
Good points and a helpful way to end our conversation. Now, if only our
elected officials would be prepared to follow our good advice!
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